Identity Theory and Falsifiability

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Identity Theory and Falsifiability. / Søgaard, Anders.

In: Acta Analytica, 2024.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Søgaard, A 2024, 'Identity Theory and Falsifiability', Acta Analytica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00587-2

APA

Søgaard, A. (2024). Identity Theory and Falsifiability. Acta Analytica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00587-2

Vancouver

Søgaard A. Identity Theory and Falsifiability. Acta Analytica. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00587-2

Author

Søgaard, Anders. / Identity Theory and Falsifiability. In: Acta Analytica. 2024.

Bibtex

@article{bef4d15e98334bccbea84c25eb8b8069,
title = "Identity Theory and Falsifiability",
abstract = "I identify a class of arguments against multiple realization (MR): BookofSand arguments. The arguments are in their general form successful under reasonably uncontroversial assumptions, but this, on the other hand, turns the table on identity theory: If arguments from MR can always be refuted by BookofSand arguments, is identity theory falsifiable? In the absence of operational demarcation criteria, it is not. I suggest a parameterized formal demarcation principle for brain state/process types and show how it can be used to identify previously unconsidered contenders for evidence for MR, e.g., binary classification, division, and sorting. For these to be actual instances of MR, the corresponding psychological kinds must be verifiably, relevantly similar. I also briefly discuss possible linguistic, behavioral, and experimental demarcation criteria for psychological kinds.",
author = "Anders S{\o}gaard",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} The Author(s) 2024.",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.1007/s12136-024-00587-2",
language = "English",
journal = "Acta Analytica",
issn = "0353-5150",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Identity Theory and Falsifiability

AU - Søgaard, Anders

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2024.

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - I identify a class of arguments against multiple realization (MR): BookofSand arguments. The arguments are in their general form successful under reasonably uncontroversial assumptions, but this, on the other hand, turns the table on identity theory: If arguments from MR can always be refuted by BookofSand arguments, is identity theory falsifiable? In the absence of operational demarcation criteria, it is not. I suggest a parameterized formal demarcation principle for brain state/process types and show how it can be used to identify previously unconsidered contenders for evidence for MR, e.g., binary classification, division, and sorting. For these to be actual instances of MR, the corresponding psychological kinds must be verifiably, relevantly similar. I also briefly discuss possible linguistic, behavioral, and experimental demarcation criteria for psychological kinds.

AB - I identify a class of arguments against multiple realization (MR): BookofSand arguments. The arguments are in their general form successful under reasonably uncontroversial assumptions, but this, on the other hand, turns the table on identity theory: If arguments from MR can always be refuted by BookofSand arguments, is identity theory falsifiable? In the absence of operational demarcation criteria, it is not. I suggest a parameterized formal demarcation principle for brain state/process types and show how it can be used to identify previously unconsidered contenders for evidence for MR, e.g., binary classification, division, and sorting. For these to be actual instances of MR, the corresponding psychological kinds must be verifiably, relevantly similar. I also briefly discuss possible linguistic, behavioral, and experimental demarcation criteria for psychological kinds.

U2 - 10.1007/s12136-024-00587-2

DO - 10.1007/s12136-024-00587-2

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85185944401

JO - Acta Analytica

JF - Acta Analytica

SN - 0353-5150

ER -

ID: 384490684